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THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY
PHILIP S. DELORIA*

INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1966, Dean Tom Christopher of the University of New
Mexico School of Law noted the dearth of Indians in the legal profession
and the lack of Indian applicants to the law school and decided to do
something about it. He suggested to Fred Hart, a visiting professor from
Boston College Law School, that Hart develop a program to increase
the number of Indian law students and, hence, the number of Indian
lawyers.' As Hart tells the story,2 he initially declined the offer on the
grounds that it was too remote from his field of commercial law and
that, as an Easterner, he was unqualified to deal with the complex cultural
problems such an undertaking would entail. Hart's wife Joan caused
history to be made by insisting that the grounds Hart considered disabling
were instead the very reasons for him to accept the challenge. The results
of Joan Hart's uxorial ruling include the creation of the Special Scholarship Program in Law for American Indians, now called the Pre-Law
Summer Institute; a virtual legal revolution in Indian affairs (as of 1993
an estimated 1500 Indian lawyers work in all fields of Indian affairs,
well over half of whom were assisted by the Program); and the creation
of the American Indian Law Center. Today, the American Indian Law
Center, Inc., is an independent non-profit, Indian-controlled research and
policy center, still located at the University of New Mexico, housed in
the School of Law, and running the pre-law program. It is the oldest
Indian policy studies organization in the nation.
THE SPECIAL SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
Professor Hart designed a pilot program consisting of an intensive
summer session for 20-30 Indian students who would then be placed in
law schools throughout the nation, including the University of New
Mexico. The summer pre-law session would be followed by scholarship
assistance for the students and informal counseling throughout their law

* Director, American Indian Law Center, Inc., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
I. Thomas W. Christopher & Frederick M. Hart, Indian Law Scholarship Program at the
University of New Mexico, 2 U. TOL. L. REV. 691 (1970); see also, Heidi H. Estes & Robert
Laurence, Preparing American Indians for Law School: The American Indian Law Center's PreLaw Summer Institute, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 278 (1992).
2. The story of the origin of the law program is part of the folklore of both the American
Indian Law Center, Inc., and the University of New Mexico School of Law. This account was
verified with Professor Hart to distinguish fact from myth-making as much as possible.
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school careers. Seeking funding, he successfully approached Dick Frost
of the Upward Bound Program at the Office of Economic Opportunity.3
The original concept was similar to Upward Bound, although at the next
educational level, offering an eight-week summer session at the law school
mainly for Indian students who had completed college but also including
a few undergraduates. 4 The program would help students decide whether
they might like law school, 5 and-in case they decided to attend-provide
them with some experience in briefing cases, using the law library,
surviving the Socratic method and other rigorous features of first year
law school.
As any competent, responsible scholar would do, Professor Hart consulted the experts in Indian education, who told him that the simulated
law school experience would present such a culture shock to Indian
students that he should batten down and prepare for the worst, equipping
the program with a cadre of social workers, psychiatrists and anthropologists. As a sensible scholar would do, Hart ignored the expert advice
and conceived of the program as any other soundly designed educational
enterprise: a program which would maintain high standards and yet be
sensitive to and attempt to meet the needs of the students as individuals,
whether those needs might arise from the students' cultural, economic,
social or personal background. Professor Hart decided he needed to
identify the barriers faced by Indian students-first to law school admission, and second to completion of law school. Then he simply had
to design a program that would assist the program participants to overcome those barriers. Professor Hart identified numerous "lacks" constituting the major barriers to the admission of Indian students to law
schools. They were the lack of: confidence on the part of the students
in their ability to become lawyers and their ability to perform in law
school; role models in the form of visible Indian lawyers; adequate
preparation at lower educational levels, especially in writing; knowledgeable placement and counseling at the elementary, secondary and
college level; knowledge of law school admissions on the part of the
applicants; and the ability to perform well on standardized tests.
The principal formal barrier, however, was inherent in the admissions
process itself as conceived at the time. Admissions criteria were based
on standard American middle class assumptions and measurements: un-

3. Upward Bound was a well-established component of the Great Society which encouraged
children of poor families to attend college by providing a mock-college session on a college campus
to expose the students to the experience of attending college, followed by supportive and.enrichment
programs when the students returned to their high schools. According to the Hart-Christopher
article, supra note 1, at 693 n.3, the Bureau of Indian Affairs contributed 10% of the program
costs.
4. The program soon stopped recruiting other than college graduates. The combined "Headstart/
Upward Bound" analogy taught that students lost the momentum and many of the benefits of the
summer program if they had to return to college for another year before entering law school.
5. The program also soon abandoned the "look-see" aspect and sought students who had
already decided they wanted to attend law school, of whom there were more than a sufficient
number. This change indicated that, at least up to the point of the program's capacity 35-40, there
was not a need to convince students to consider law school for the first time.
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dergraduate grade point average; LSAT score; well-rounded undergraduate
activities; volunteer work and so on. No one seriously thought that these
criteria measured ultimate human value, or (in the Duke Power6 sense)
that they measured precisely the qualities of the best law students or
lawyers. But law schools needed some fair and reasonably objective bases
for comparing applicants, many of whom were nearly equally qualified.
Minority groups had not as yet been able to convince law schools that
their exclusion based on the standard criteria was needlessly damaging
to them, to society, and to law schools. Nor had they been able to
challenge the prevailing standards by demonstrating successfully that a
class of students-Indian students, in this case-whose systemic disadvantages caused them to rate low by the standard criteria could demonstrate through alternative means their ability to succeed in law school.
The summer program for Indian students, named the "Special Scholarship
Program in Law for American Indians," was able to offer an alternative
basis for the admission to law school of Indian students who did not
necessarily fit the mainstream standards-a performance test. 7 It is largely
overlooked in the history of legal education that this performance-based
program for a minority was the first such program in the nation, predating
the more famous CLEO8 program by one year.
Professor Hart made several decisions that were to prove to be key
to the remarkable success of the program. First, he decided to stick to
his area of expertise: legal education. The romance of working with
Indian students would suggest other goals to tempt many do-gooders,
but Hart is a legal educator. The fairness of the American legal system
to Indian tribes; the responsibilities of the students to their communities;
the development of new legal theories to advance Indian interests in the
American legal and political system; the neo-colonial adventure of training
a new generation of leaders of "emerging nations," all beckon one who
might establish a pre-law program for Indian students. Hart reasoned
that these important questions probably should be addressed by the
students themselves in the course of their Jaw school careers and subsequent practice. But it was up to Indian families and communities to
define their social responsibilities as Indian people. The program's job
was to make Indian students successful law students. The law school's
job was to make lawyers out of them. And, it was the students' responsibility to decide whether to use their legal education to change

6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Holding that an employer was prohibited
by the Civil Rights Act from requiring a high school education or passing of a standardized general
intelligence test as a condition of employment where neither standard was related to successful job
performance and both operated to disqualify black applicants substantially more often than white
applicants.).
7. Law schools are understandably wary of a performance standard since law school admissions,
after the "first look," is largely not a process for determining who can perform successfully in
law school but who will be given the opportunity to do so.
8. The Council on Legal Educational Opportunity is a coalition of organizations operating prelaw summer programs at various law schools throughout the country. It targets the economically
disadvantaged, mainly minorities.
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society, to serve their tribes or, like the vast majority of their law school
colleagues, to make a living.
Professor Hart also realized that, romantic aspirations notwithstanding,
an eight-week summer program would not be able to serve successfully
as an activist training center, or help a student overcome severe language
difficulties or fully compensate for inadequate education up to the college
level, and then still prepare students to survive in law school. Had there
been any doubt on whether the program should be heroically remedial,
the first few summer sessions made it clear that some students, regardless
of their innate intelligence, would not make it in law school and would
either have to choose another career or, if they were determined to enter
law school and succeed, to seek intensive remedial work in another forum. 9
The program's goal, then, was simply to produce successful Indian
law students. If everyone else did their jobs, the Indian students would
eventually become lawyers and serve their Indian communities and the
nation. In order to achieve that goal, the program had to maintain its
integrity, both with its student participants and with law schools. The
students expected to receive the program's best efforts in the admissions
process, but also recognized that the program was not going to place
students who had no chance of success and who would experience failure
unnecessarily. For the first few years of the program some students were
told that the program could not recommend them for law school admission. Although this decision was made in the best interest of the
student, it was threatening to the refunding prospects of the program
given the natural bureaucratic tendency to measure program success by
the number of placements. It was, however, deemed to be neither in the
long-term interest of the program nor fair to the student to place her
or him in law school only to fail. Making this judgment accurately with
a student population possessing a unique profile of abilities was, of
course, the skill that had to be developed overnight by the program staff.
The program also had to build relationships with law schools throughout
the nation. Although some students in each summer's class had been
admitted to a law school, many (sometimes more than half) had to be
placed in a school to which they had not applied-a difficult task even
0 days. Many other programs would have addressed this
in pre-deFunis'

9. The Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988), rightly prohibits identifying students
publicly, but it can be said that Indian affairs and many tribes have benefitted unexpectedly from
two categories of program participants: summer students who did not subsequently attend or complete
law school, but returned to their tribe and used their limited legal education from the summer
program or a few semesters in law school in tribal government positions; and students about whom
the program was wrong, i.e., who seemed to have no chance in law school but, by virtue of heroic
motivation and determination, gained admission, graduated and went on to have productive careers.
10. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Applicant denied admission to law school sought
injunctive relief claiming admissions process violated his constitutional rights. The injunction was
granted and appeals followed. Court declined to reach merits, declaring the case moot because
petitioner was in his final quarter of law school when the case reached the Court.); Regents of
Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (White male denied admission to medical school
filed reverse discrimination suit and Court held that the special admissions program was illegal, but
race could be considered in admissions process.).
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issue by hiring a placement officer to learn about law schools and their
admissions procedures as well as begin to build relationships with law
school admissions officers throughout the nation. In another fortuitous
choice, the Assistant Dean for Admissions at the University of New
Mexico Law School undertook to place the summer program students.
The Assistant Dean, Hunter Geer, was already a well-respected member
of the fraternity of law school admissions officers, and his credibility in
the field was credited to his judgments about the summer Indian students"
as well. The program quickly gained a reputation among law schools for
being accurate and honest in its recommendations, rather than shortsightedly running up the score with placements of students who would
2
not be successful.'

With a good recruitment program, a rigorous academic program, and
an honest placement effort, the program established its reputation among
law schools and thereby helped remove the major barriers to law school
admissions for Indians in a way that could not long be ignored. All of
the students who were deemed able to survive in law school were placed,
as has been the case in every summer since the first. This is not to say
that all law schools opened up like Jericho. Even today some law schools
have little concern for Indian students, either in the admissions process
or during their law school careers if the students are admitted. Yet, the
Special Summer Program in Law for American Indians breached the
most important barrier by demonstrating the arbitrariness of traditional
standards, shifting the burden to the holdout schools to defend their
admissions criteria.
Having breached the walls, Hart and his colleagues, in consultation
with knowledgeable people in Indian education, had then to'consider the
barriers to the success of Indian students in law school. The first and
most significant such barrier, it was thought-accurately, as it turned
out-was financial aid. Most Indian students who drop out of school
do so for financial reasons. This was particularly true in the case of law
students, since most of the Indian student population tended at that time
to be older students with families, whose financial needs were relatively
greater than those of their generally younger, unmarried non-Indian
classmates. To help overcome this barrier, the program had a generous
(for its time) financial aid package which was part of the Special Scholarship Program grant and administered by Hart and his staff, rather
than by the individual schools or by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This
control of financial aid and the flexibility Professor Hart built into the
program gave him the discretion to adapt the financial packages to each
student and to meet emergency needs. From the beginning and until the
last few years of the scholarship component of the program in 1986,

II. Not, of course, the "Indian summer students;" the program was held in June and July.
12. The Pre-Law Summer Institute now handles placement in-house using the services of the
program director, Heidi Estes. The program's reputation with law schools for honesty has never
been tarnished.
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checks were mailed out monthly to students, not to tantalize them, but
to keep in touch with the students over the school year. For example,
many problems requiring informal counseling were revealed in chatty
notes accompanying the monthly receipts that were returned by students
from each financial aid check.' 3
The second presumed barrier to success in law school was based on
a bit of conventional wisdom that may or may not be -true, but is virtually
a theorem of Indian education. That is, that culturally, Indians tend to
be "shy," less willing than non-Indians to speak in class or to call
attention to themselves in front of their classmates and become more
embarrassed than non-Indians by mistakes made in class. If true, this
pattern of shyness could certainly be crippling in the hazing process of
the Socratic method, with its boot camp-like toughness. Whether this
attribution is true, or more true of Indians than others, it is almost selfevident that if any student has eight weeks to experience the first semester
of law school under dry-run conditions, he or she will find it easier
under "game" conditions in the fall. The added advantage, it was presumed, was that undergoing this trial in the company of fellow Indians
was somehow less traumatic than doing so in a school where one might
be the only Indian student.
The company of fellow Indians was considered to be an important
factor, but in a different sense was also thought to carry over into the
school year as well. Indian law students experienced a unique sense of
isolation; many were, in fact, the first Indians to attend their particular
law school and were the only Indian students there at the time. Those
who attended western law schools often felt that they had infiltrated the
enemy's boot camp. The Law Center pre-law summer program built a
cadre of Indian students in some schools like New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Arizona State, and the University of California at Los Angeles. 14 But as
countless students have testified, the network from the summer program
provided great comfort to many isolated Indian law students over the
years and created a national sense of community among Indian lawyers
tied together by the summer program experience. 5 Had these people
13. The program characteristically uses the term "informal counseling." Typically, a student
may have informed the program of an academic problem, and Professor Hart or the staff who
later replaced him might have been able to discuss the problem with the student and suggest a
strategy or, in some cases and always with the consent of the student, discuss the problem with
the student's school administration. Sometimes tutoring was arranged and, in a few cases students
were allowed to take a lighter than usual course load for a semester to aid in recovering from a
personal problem.
14. The program has assisted students in more than 65 schools throughout the nation. A few
schools, largely from states with large Indian populations, have maintained from the beginning a
continuing policy of recruitment and retention of Indian law students. Others have a brief flurry
of interest and recruitment, followed by a down period. The distinguishing factor proves to be a
faculty member with an interest in Indian law who, after a flash, either loses interest or moves to
another job or school.
15. At the national conference of the Indian Section of the Federal Bar Association, a meeting
attended by upwards of 300 people each year, Mike Anderson (Creek, summer pre-law program
1981), then Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians and presently Associate
Solicitor for Indian Affairs of the United States Department of Interior, began his remarks to a
seminar by identifying himself according to the year he attended the summer program.
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attended separate law schools without the summer program, their ability
to share experiences throughout the country and collaborate on similar
legal problems would have been delayed indefinitely. In this sense, the
summer program has played a role for the Indian bar similar to that
of a state law school for a state bar.
The absence of a specific remedial focus enabled the program to attract
students with a wide range of abilities, including a good number who
would have gained admission and most likely succeeded without the
program. This mix helped all of the students to approach law school
with less of a sense of "affirmative action unworthiness." It also raised
the level of performance throughout the summer program and made
possible the sense of community enjoyed by virtually all of each year's
entering group of Indian law students which has led to the remarkable
sense of organization of the Indian bar throughout the nation.
After the first year as an Upward Bound pilot project, the program
was funded by the Indian Desk of the OEO Community Action Program,
the source of many innovative programs in social services, economic
development and related fields during the salad days of the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO).' 6 Finally, in 1971 funding responsibility
was transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs Branch of Education,
where it has remained ever since. Although the Special Scholarship Program in Law has been by far the most successful program ever funded
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, measured by graduation rate and certainly
in terms of impact on Indian affairs, the program has never been included
in the formal budget of any administration. During most of the period
1971-86, the program was funded out of general Higher Education funds.
In 1986, funding for the program was cut off by then-Assistant Secretary
of Interior Ross Swimmer, a Cherokee lawyer who had not participated
in the program. Subsequently, through the volunteer lobbying efforts of
Pawnee/Comanche lawyer Kevin Gover (summer program 1978; University
of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. 1981) and his law firm, Gover,
Stetson, and Williams, the summer program-stripped of the scholarship
component and renamed the Pre-Law Summer Institute-has been placed
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs budget by Congress every year.
The achievement resulting from Professor Hart's foundation has been
remarkable. The overall design of the program has varied little from the
original pattern set by Hart over the first three years. At the outset,
Hart and Christopher conducted a brief survey and could find fewer
than 25 Indian lawyers in the nation and about 15 Indian law students.
Present estimates of Indian lawyers exceed 1,500; law students about 250.
The impact has been impossible to measure because it has been so great.
Indian lawyers, summer program alumni, are found throughout Indian
affairs: tribal attorneys; tribal chairpersons; tribal chief justices, supreme

16. As one of the scattered remnants of OEO like the Job Corps, Headstart and the like, the
old Indian Desk of the Community Action Program is now the Administration for Native Americans
in the Department of Health and Human Services.
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court justices, trial court judges (as well as a growing number of state
and municipal judges); tribal attorneys general (and one state attorney
general); and a United States Attorney (in the Carter Administration).
Indian lawyers can be found throughout the Interior Solicitors Office,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs and the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs staffs.
Indian lawyers have their own law firms and serve as executive directors
and staff attorneys in many national and regional Indian advocacy organizations. 7 Two Assistant Secretaries for Indian Affairs in the Interior
Department have been summer program graduates, Tom Fredericks and
Ada Deer, along with at least four Deputy Assistant Secretaries who
have been summer program alumni or who were helped in law school
with financial assistance.
The success of the Special Scholarship Program has helped to define
several underlying policy issues in Indian affairs and in American Indian
education which have yet to be addressed definitively. In the early years
of the program, its remarkable success attracted many of the best students
of their generation to law school. This phenomenon may have had the
effect of delaying somewhat the entry of Indians into other important
professions, raising the issue of the impact of successful programs on
higher education and general social development of tribes, i.e., a talent
8
drain away from professions with no analogous program." Had the Bureau
of Indian Affairs quickly capitalized on the success of the law program
and tried to replicate it for other professions, the available talent may
have been more evenly distributed throughout the professions and disciplines needed by Indian tribes to assist with their development-but
then the revolution in Indian law and politics may have been delayed.
The other unresolved policy problem concerns the definition of the
class of people to be helped by Indian programs in society in general.
Although the program from the early years understood that in eight
weeks it could not accomplish miracles for students with limited English
and limited education, it could draw on a pool of educated Indian students
who maintained strong connections with their tribes and intended to
return to tribal communities to work. As the years have gone by and
competition for law school admission has increased, both the program
and law schools have faced an increasing number of what could be called
"descendants of Indians," i.e., people who claim Indian blood but have
little connection with Indian tribes or even the Indians in their own
families. The program can maintain its focus by relying on the natural
filter represented by the Bureau of Indian Affairs definition of eligibility
for services. Law schools have no such luxury. To this point, law schools
have not been able to define a workable definition of the Indian population

17. Licensed attorney and member of the Sisseton Sioux Tribe, Creighton Robertson (summer
program 1972) was recently elected Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of South Dakota, demonstrating
the difficulty of predicting at the outset all the anticipated benefits of a program.
18. A similar program for Indian medical students, INMED, has been in operation at the
University of North Dakota since the 1970s, funded by the Indian Health Service.
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they are aiming to reach. Some schools are earnestly seeking a definition
which does not simply reward a fortuitous great-grandmother, while others
are somewhat cynically unconcerned, content to accept any self-identified
"Indian" at face value. The concern is based on more than the misuse
of resources which should be available to Indian students. It is also
directed at the consequences for legal education of law schools permitting
students to gain admission by fraudulently claiming a status to which
they are not entitled, raising serious questions about their future performance as lawyers.
THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER
The launching of the Special Scholarship Program in Law for American
Indians in 1967 had other effects as well. It sent a message throughout
Indian country that the University of New Mexico School of Law,
located-as the state's tourist brochures say-in the "Heart of Indian
Country," indeed had an interest in Indian legal issues. Tribal governments
in the region, particularly the Navajo Tribe and its judicial system,
contacted the law school to determine the scope of its interest in Indian
law and particularly in the development of tribal legal and governmental
institutions. The law school took several small contracts to train tribal
judges and court clerks. As interest in the law school's services mushroomed, however, a decision had to be made regarding the commitment
the law school was willing to make to tribal governments. Professor Hart
and Dean Christopher decided to create the American Indian Law Center
to serve as an umbrella over the Special Scholarship Program and all
other Indian service and research activities. At this time, in late 1968,
the Johnson Administration was leaving office, and Hart and Christopher
offered the first Directorship of the American Indian Law Center to the
highly-respected Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Robert LaFollette Bennett, an Oneida Indian born and raised on his Wisconsin reservation
(and, ironically, a Republican).' 9
Commissioner Bennett's contacts in the field led to additional projects
from Indian tribes themselves and offers of assistance from several foundations to help launch the Law Center, notably the Donner Foundation
and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Bennett showed a particular
interest in helping tribes develop tribal codes and in offering training
programs for tribal judges, clerks and other court and government personnel. He also laid the groundwork for one of the most significant
areas of activity throughout the Law Center's history, the development
of tribal capacities in juvenile law, children's law, and family law. To
help pursue these interests, Bennett hired Ms. Toby Grossman, a legal
aid attorney from Albuquerque, who has, since joining the Law Center,

19. Commissioner Bennett had earned his law degree at night while stationed in Washington
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). During his lifelong career of service with BIA, Commissioner
Bennett had become acquainted with virtually every tribal leader in the country and nearly every
employee of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service.
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attained national renown with her expertise in these areas. Building on
Bennett's foresight, the Law Center has established and maintained leadership in juvenile justice, family law, children's law, social services; and
related fields.
In addition to the work of Ms. Grossman, a number of Indian attorneys
have provided leadership in the field of Indian family law and juvenile
law while working at the Law Center. The Law Center has benefitted
over the years from the work of such Indian lawyers as Thelma Stiffarm
(Gros Ventre; summer program 1970), who was Assistant Director of the
Law Center during the mid-70's and under whose leadership the Model
Children's Code, the first in the nation, was developed; and Nancy Tuthill
(Quapaw, summer program 1975), who worked with Ms. Stiffarm on
the Model Children's Code, served as Assistant Director, Acting Director
during my leave in 1980 and during my sabbatical in 1985-86. Ms. Tuthill
remained with the Law Center until 1986. Ms. Tuthill further developed
the Law Center's national leadership in various family law and related
fields, expanding to include capacity building in the general area of social
services administration.
After three years as Director of the Law Center, Commissioner Bennett
retired in 1972, and appointed me in his place. I am a Standing Rock
Sioux who joined the staff in 1971 to administer the Scholarship Program.
Although Mr. Bennett had built the Law Center into a significant training
and technical assistance institution, he had not made an irrevocable
commitment to an overall direction. I was greeted with the opportunity
to chart the direction of the Law Center for the future in broader fields
of policy analysis. We were soon faced with the need to respond to
developing issues and to evolve a comprehensive vision of Indian policy
which has been the cornerstone of our contribution to Indian policy
analysis over the years.
The basic problem with training and technical assistance programs in
the early 1970's persists today. Whether they are funded by national
contracts from federal agencies or by individual tribes, they are episodic
and short-term in nature and directed at a small proportion of the total
population in need of training. There are presently more than 150 tribal
courts in the nation. To meet all their training needs adequately requires
a varied program of offerings throughout the country, a commitment
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs is for the most part ill-equipped to
underwrite. If training is controlled by the individual tribes, an elaborate
marketing program is required of the Law Center or a similar training
institution. These considerations become even more complicated when
applied to the less-defined training needs of other parts of tribal government. The Law Center, although remaining available for training and
code development work, decided to explore other roles which would
enable it to have a greater impact on the field of Indian affairs.
The opportunity to do so was presented fortuitously in mid-1972, in
the course of a meeting of the Board of Directors of the National Tribal
Chairmens Association, an organization of the 1970's formed at the
suggestion of Robert Bennett to play the role in Indian affairs played
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by the National Governors Association or the National Conference of
Mayors for state and local government. While waiting at the Board
meeting to present another issue, I heard the previous speaker, Bob
Robertson of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO),20
describe to the board a major organizational change in the way federal
domestic assistance agencies handled the funding of Indian programs, a
change designed to facilitate the administration's policy of regionalization.
Essentially, the administration proposed the dissolution of agency Indian
Desks, which had been the Washington-based funding mechanisms
throughout the Great Society, as direct funding of Indian tribal governments by federal domestic assistance agencies increased greatly.
When the chairmen in attendance expressed their opposition to the
change and described their fear that it would have a devastating effect
on Indian programs, Robertson piqued my interest in the relationship
of tribal governments to the structure of federal domestic assistance
programs by saying, "We are not asking for your opinions. The decision
has already been made, and we are simply here to inform you." As a
result of this meeting and Robertson's arrogant representation of the
administration, the American Indian Law Center volunteered to provide
the staff support for a joint effort in opposition to the proposed structural
change, led by the National Tribal Chairmens Association and the National
Congress of American Indians. In the course of this effort, which involved
intertribal meetings throughout the country, I became acquainted with
the author of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) study which
was the basis of the proposed changes, called the FAR Report (for
Federal Assistance Review). Over the period of three to four months as
we debated the FAR Report before tribal audiences, the author, Sydney
Freeman, an employee of the Office of Management and Budget, patiently
explained to me the importance to tribal governments of federal management issues.
The structure of the federal domestic assistance program delivery system
had not been considered important to tribal governments. Indeed, until
the advent of the Great Society, tribal governments for the most part
dealt only with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health
Service within the federal government. But as domestic assistance programs, the hundreds of categorical grants available to state and local
governments, grew in importance in the late 60's, some of them began
to provide funding to tribal governments and tribes soon saw the potential
importance to tribal development of these other programs and agencies.
Freeman explained that three major issues needed to be addressed if
tribes were to take their place in the family of American governments

20. The National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO), created by Lyndon Johnson and
continued by President Nixon, was an organization chaired by the Vice-President of the United
States and composed of cabinet officers and tribal representatives. Its purpose was to coordinate
federal Indian programs. Because of the limited participation by the Vice-President and the cabinet
officers, the NCIO was subject to the propensity of the staff to meddle in Indian politics rather
than address federal coordination issues.
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and if they were to reap the maximum benefits from these valuable
resources. First, Indian tribal governments were not even being served
by the majority of the programs that were available to their state and
municipal counterparts. For the most part, Congress simply had not
addressed the issue of tribal participation explicitly in the authorizing
statute, and the administering agency-assuming that all Indian needs
were being met by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health
Service-did not seek out tribal applicants. Clearly, Freeman said, if
Indian tribes are federally-recognized, they should be recognized as governments throughout the federal government and not just by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service. And if Indian tribal
governments are to be the relevant local government on Indian reservations, they should have access to the same assistance available to state
and municipal government. Second, Indian tribes were not fully recognized
as governments within the federal grants management structure. For
example, the OMB Circulars 2 outlining the rules for the administration
of federal grants by grant recipients included Indian tribes with nonprofits rather than with state and local governments. It was important,
then, for tribal governments to insist that they be treated as governments
uniformly throughout the federal system, both for the benefit of their
own program administration and to establish in all respects their full
governmental status vis-A-vis the federal government. And third, Freeman
said, tribes should learn more about the federal agencies administering
domestic assistance programs. The lesson of the FAR Report was that
the Indian Desk model of funding-a small office in Washington funding
tribes directly with set-aside funding from the agency's total appropriation-might have worked well with the Community Action Program and
a few other agencies, but it made no sense in agencies administering
hundreds of programs, such as the Departments of Housing and Urban
Development or the then-Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
For these departments, tribes must develop much more complex funding
strategies and press the department to adopt them unless tribal governments were to be buried in the highly competitive race for funds.
In the course of many long conversations in which Freeman generously
shared his enormous knowledge of federal administration, Freeman also
changed some of his own views and agreed to modify the most objectionable recommendations of the FAR Report to conform to tribal positions. The result for the Law Center was a continuing interest in the
importance of management issues to long-term tribal development prospects, at least insofar as federal funds were considered important.
As a followup to the FAR exercise, the NCIO conducted a study of
the rate of tribal participation in federal domestic assistance programs,
learning that of nearly 1,000 programs listed in the Catalogue of Federal
Domestic Assistance Programs, only 78 served any Indian tribes at all,

21. OMB Circulars are the regulations issued by the Office of Management and Budget prescribing
for the federal government certain rules of program administration.
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and of that only 39 served more than one tribe. Fewer than 15 federal
programs had a broad-based Indian effort under way. Conducting this
study-known as FIDAP, or Federal Indian Domestic Assistance Programs-was a colleague of Freeman's, Robert Garlock, another OMB
employee and long-time expert in federal administration. Soon after the
completion of the FIDAP Study, the Law Center received funding from
the then-Office of Native American Programs (now the Administration
for Native Americans) to research the authorizing legislation to determine
whether tribes were specifically included in program legislation, whether
the eligibility provisions of the legislation could be read to include tribal
governments or whether the legislation, by specifying "state governments
and their subdivisions," for example, could not be read to include tribes.
The FIDAP and FIDAP legislation study created an interest on the
part of the Law Center in the issues of structure and organization and
their importance to tribal governments, including the structure of delivery
systems and the place in them for tribal governments, and the importance
of interagency coordination in funding Indian programs. In 1977, Garlock
joined the Law Center on a two-year Intergovernmental Personnel Act
assignment. At the completion of that assignment, he retired from federal
employment and joined the Law Center staff on a full time basis. He
continues to work as a consultant to the Law Center on federal and
tribal organizational and management issues to the present day.
WORLD COUNCIL OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
In 1974, I was asked by a number of national Indian organizations,
principally the National Congress of American Indians, to represent the
Indians of the United States at a meeting organized by the National
Indian Brotherhood of Canada. The purpose of the meeting was to
determine the level of interest in the formation of an international organization of indigenous peoples. This meeting, held in Georgetown,
Guyana, was attended by representatives of the indigenous peoples of
Canada, the United States, Guyana, Colombia, Greenland, the Saami 22
people of the Scandinavian countries, the Maoris of New Zealand, and
the Aboriginal people of Australia. After several days of discussion, the
group agreed upon the need for an international organization and resolved
to convene a conference for the purpose of establishing such a structure.
A second planning meeting for the organizational conference of what
would come to be called the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the
first such organization in history, was held in Copenhagen, Denmark,
in early 1975. I attended the meeting in Denmark and headed the delegation from the United States which also included Charles Trimble,
Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians.
The Organizational Conference of the World Council of Indigenous
Peoples was held in November of 1975 in Port Alberni, Vancouver Island,

22. These are the people known commonly as Lapps, or Laplanders, a name objectionable to
them.
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British Columbia. Representatives of indigenous peoples from nineteen
nations, mostly from the Western Hemisphere, attended the conference.
George Manuel, the visionary President of the National Indian Brotherhood, was elected the first president of the World Council. I was elected
the first Secretary General, to serve a two-year term. During this tenure,
I was the first accredited indigenous person to the United Nations,
representing the National Indian Brotherhood and the World Council as
non-governmental organizations or NGOs, in United Nations parlance.
The World Council played a role in convening the first and historic
regional meeting of Central American Indian organizations sponsored by
the Indian organizations of Panama. 23 The Law Center also helped to
encourage submissions by indigenous organizations to the study of the
conditions of indigenous peoples conducted by the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Law Center's involvement with the World Council ended
with the expiration of my term as Secretary General in 1977. Although
the Center's interest in the international protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples continues, the bulk of its work is dedicated to domestic
Indian affairs.
FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER AS
AN INDEPENDENT INDIAN-CONTROLLED CORPORATION
In 1977, the American Indian Law Center became an independent,
Indian-controlled 501(c)(3) corporation separate from the University of
New Mexico. In fact, the Law Center had been operating from the outset
as an Indian-controlled entity within the law school with complete autonomy as to policy and substantive matters. The impetus for the Law
Center's separation from the University came from funding agencies. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs pointed out that the annual renewal of the
Special Scholarship Program in Law contract could be facilitated under
the "Buy Indian" Act if the Law Center were an Indian contractor.
Foundations advised that under recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, their reporting requirements to Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
under lobbying restrictions, were more burdensome when grants were
made to a public university than if the Law Center became a 501(c)(3)
corporation.
In 1977, the American Indian Law Center became incorporated under
New Mexico law. In addition to myself as Director, the original board
members included Ben Hanley (Navajo), then of the Navajo Nation Legal
Department and a long-time member of the Arizona House of Representatives (summer pre-law program 1967); Joe DeLaCruz (Quinault),

23. As an omen of the future of international indigenous affairs, this meeting organized by
Central American Indian Organizations was interrupted by a group of anthropologists, with a few
Indians in tow, announcing an upcoming conference of indigenous peoples in Geneva in 1977, billed
as "the first international meeting of indigenous peoples organized by indigenous peoples." So much
for the fabled anthropologists' training as observers.
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Chairman of the Quinault Indian Nation; Forrest Gerard (Blackfeet),
former professional staff member of the Senate Interior Committee specializing in Indian affairs; Tom Fredericks (Mandan), Director of the
Native American Rights Fund (summer pre-law program 1969). Fred
Hart, by then Dean of the Law School, was named ex officio board
member in order to maintain the connection with the law school.
The composition of the board changed quickly, however. Gerard and
Fredericks resigned when they joined the Carter Administration in late
1977. Gerard became the first Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian
Affairs, a newly-created position elevated from the old Commissioner of
Indian Affairs. Fredericks became the first Indian to be Associate Solicitor
for Indian Affairs in the Interior Solicitor's office. 24 In addition, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs-the agency that had recommended the incorporation of the Law Center in the first place-questioned the motives
for the AILC incorporation and insisted that Hart resign from the board
so that it would be 100% Indian, a requirement that the Bureau had
not consistently made of other "Buy Indian" contractors. Eventually,
Governor Robert Lewis of the Zuni Pueblo and Nancy M. Tuthill (Quapaw), then Assistant Director of the Law Center and presently Editor
with the Broadcast Standards and Practices Department of the American
Broadcasting Company, replaced Gerard and Fredericks on the Board
of Directors.
THE LATE SEVENTIES
Newly-elected President Jimmy Carter entered office with a promise
to make major changes in the structure of the federal government. This
promise was to be fulfilled through the President's Reorganization Project
(PRP), a comprehensive initiative operated from the White House intended
to examine the underlying assumptions of every agency in the federal
government. Seeing this project as a potential threat to Indian interests
if not implemented with an understanding of the special circumstances
of the federal government's Indian programs, a coalition of Indian organizations including the American Indian Law Center, Inc., formed to
oversee and comment on the work of the President's Reorganization
Project.
This cooperative venture, in which the Law Center played a central
role, was successful in integrating Indian tribal concerns into the work
of the PRP and was the occasion for developing techniques of interorganizational cooperation among national and regional Indian organizations under the overall direction of Indian tribal governments. Although
many reorganization proposals were advanced by the PRP, it soon became
clear that the Carter Administration's only real interest was the creation

24. Fredericks went on to replace Gerard and become the second Assistant Secretary of Interior
for Indian Affairs, serving at the end of the Carter Administration. The incumbent Assistant
Secretary in the Clinton Administration, Ada Deer (Menominee, summer pre-law program 1972),
started law school but dropped out to lead the successful effort to restore her tribe to federallyrecognized status.
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of the Department of Education, a campaign promise crucial to Carter's
obtaining the support of the powerful National Education Association.
The Administration felt strongly that no exceptions should be allowed
to the principle that all federal education programs should be included
in the new department, including the Indian educational programs of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Indian tribes have a complex relationship with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, which was illustrated in the Carter PRP exercise. Despite their
disenchantment with Bureau of Indian Affairs Education, the tribes had
strong misgivings about their prospects in a cabinet Department of Education. The tribes reasoned that in such a department, Indian concerns
would be buried amid broad national educational issues, many of them
defined in terms of urban America. Furthermore, the tribes perceived
that a Department of Education would follow the pattern of the other
domestic assistance departments, and define their world in terms of
federal, state and municipal delivery systems. Within such a set of assumptions, a relatively small, tribally-centered system of Indian education
would be engaged in a constant struggle for survival and identity. Despite
warnings from the PRP that the Administration would spare no effort
to prevent exceptions to the transfer of education programs into the new
department, the tribal coalition prevailed and the Department of Education
as created by Congress included only those Indian education programs
which had been in the predecessor United States Office of Education.
The other major Law Center program during the Carter administration
was a paralegal training program funded by the Department of Labor
as a part of an economic stimulus initiative. The Law Center conceived
the notion of a paralegal position for tribal governments that would
specialize in the operation of federal domestic assistance programs. Trainees would be trained in the federal legislative process, both creating
programs and appropriating funding, the executive process of setting up
a program agency and issuing regulations, the process of executive budgeting and allocation of appropriations, and other minutia of federal
program administration important to the support of tribal programs.
These paralegals were called Federal Program Technicians and were trained
to work in tribal government not as lawyers' assistants, but as independent
officials in tribal planning offices, executive offices and the like. In fact,
by the completion of their training, these technicians probably knew more
about federal programs than the average lawyer.
The tribal Federal Program Technicians program trained 100 paralegals
in a two year period, using a combination of classroom sessions in
Albuquerque and clinical placements with federal and tribal governments.
Many participants in the paralegal program eventually attended and completed law school. They include tribal judges, tribal attorneys and many
other functionaries with tribal and other governments.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
At about the same time, the Law Center was drawn into consideration
of another set of tribal government relationships: those with state and

Spring 19941

THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER

municipal governments. In 1975, Congress created the American Indian
Policy Review Commission (AIPRC), perhaps the most hopeful of a long
line of attempts to address Indian policy comprehensively. The commission, composed of six members of Congress and five representatives of
Indian tribes, was to address policy issues existing between Indian tribes
and the United States through a series of task forces. The result of its
two year effort was a comprehensive report by the Commission which
represented a wish list of the Indian community, an idealized list with
virtually no chance of enactment by the Congress. 25 The final report
caused an uproar among non-Indians living on and near Indian reservations, because they were alarmed at the Commission's recommendations
which would have greatly increased tribal jurisdiction over them. The
report caused what was called at the time a "backlash" against Indian
interests to sweep non-Indian Indian country. As a part of this backlash,
Congressman Glen Cunningham and Congressman Lloyd Meeds, a former
member of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, introduced
several pieces of legislation that would have abrogated treaties and greatly
restricted Indian water rights and tribal jurisdiction on reservations. The
introduction of the Cunningham-Meeds bills set off a round of spirited
discussion of Indian'policy throughout the nation.
In December of 1976, a task force of the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) met in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to discuss Indian
policy issues and, among other things, to decide whether to recommend
that NCSL support the Cunningham-Meeds legislation. The American
Indian Law Center was invited to attend this meeting and to engage in
an informal debate before the task force with a representative of Congressman Meeds. As the debate proceeded, the Law Center representative
argued that NCSL had little to gain by supporting the CunninghamMeeds legislation. Instead, the Law Center suggested that the NCSL focus
on the common interests of state and tribal governments and invite the
major national Indian organizations to begin a joint effort to explore
methods of increasing state-tribal cooperation and coordination.
The task force recommended to its parent body that NCSL accept the
Law Center's suggestion and invite the major national Indian organizations
to join in such an effort. As a result, the National Congress of American
Indians and the now-defunct National Tribal Chairmen's Association
jointly chartered, with NCSL, the Commission on State-Tribal Relations
composed of equal numbers of state legislators and tribal chairpeople,
with staffing provided jointly by NCSL and the American Indian Law
Center. 26 These three pioneering organizations were later joined in their
sponsorship by the National Association of Counties and the Western

25. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REviEw COMM'N, 95th CoNG.,
Print 1977).

1st SEss., FINAL REPORT (Comm.

26. The NCSL staff member, Tassie Hanna, quickly gained an expertise in'state-tribal relations.
She eventually resigned from NCSL and enrolled at the University of New Mexico School of Law.
Hanna worked part-time for the Law Center on the State-Tribal Commission and then full-time
upon her graduation.
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Association of Attorneys General.2 7 The Commission was initially cochaired by Joe DeLaCruz (Chairman of the Quinault Indian Nation) for
the tribes and Speaker Ed Manning of the Rhode Island House of
Representatives for the states (replaced after two years by Senator Sue
Gould of the Washington State Senate, followed by Senator Carroll
Graham of the Montana State Senate). As other branches of state and
municipal government were added to the Commission, chairmanship by
only legislators was deemed no longer appropriate. Although neither the
National nor the Western Governors Associations formally joined or
chartered the State-Tribal Commission, Governor William Janklow of
South Dakota agreed to be the first governor to serve as co-chair for
state and local government, followed by Governor Bruce Babbitt of
Arizona. The Commission remained active until the mid-1980s, when its
funding was cut off by Assistant Secretary Ross Swimmer using the
Gramm-Rudman exercise as a pretext. In the ensuing years, the chartering
organizations and other organizations of tribal, state and municipal government have pursued separate paths to improving intergovernmental
relations on Indian reservations.
Although the Commission on State-Tribal Relations is mourned by
those who worked most closely with it, its brief career must be seen as
successful. At its inception, state-tribal relations were largely in a posture
of competition and hostility. At the height of the Commission's activity,
witnesses were able to see the remarkable sight of tribal and state political
candidates running on platforms promising improvement in state-tribal
relations rather than the bellicose platforms more characteristic of tribes
and state governments in "Indian country." The Commission also published the Handbook on State-Tribal Relations,21 A Comprehensive Study
of State-Tribal Agreements, 29 and a number of special studies of such
intergovernmental issues as the administration of block grants, the implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and a study of crossdeputization including a model cross-deputization agreement. Perhaps the
most lasting contribution of the Commission was that it succeeded in
putting improved relations on the national agenda of state and tribal
governments.
During the 1980s, following the initiative of Nancy Tuthill, the Law
Center undertook numerous projects dealing with tribal capacities in
various areas of family law, social services and protection of children.
The Law Center hired Marc Mannes, a non-Indian social scientist who
had worked with tribal contract schools, to help Ms. Tuthill pursue these

27. The membership of the Western Association of Attorneys General (WAAG) voted at a
meeting in Utah in 1978 to co-sponsor the State-Tribal Commission. The Commission membership
included several state Attorneys General. But the WAAG organization itself did not actively support
the Commission's work after the initial vote of support.
28. On file at the American Indian Law Center, University of New Mexico School of Law,
Albuquerque, New Mexcio.
29. On file at the American Indian Law Center, University of New Mexico School of Law,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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areas of interest. The two, working with Ms. Grossman and various other
staff members, also formed a relationship with Walter R. McDonald &
Associates, a consulting firm with broad experience and broad contacts
in social services. Under this broad-based team approach, the Law Center
developed a Tribal Information System for social services case management, a bulletin board for tribal social services programs, and an approach
to the investigation and prosecution by tribal governments of child abuse
and child sexual abuse.
In 1989, the Law Center was asked by several New Mexico Pueblos
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to provide the management and staff
support for an intertribal appellate court to serve the Southwest. Governed
by an advisory board of tribal judges, the Southwest Intertribal Court
of Appeals (SWITCA) was established at the Law Center and the first
director was hired, Bettie Rushing. Ms. Rushing, a Creek who had
graduated from the University of New Mexico School of Law in 1977,
had worked for the Law Center in the late 1970s subsequent to her
graduation from law school, directing the Special Scholarship Program.
In the intervening time, she had been the chief judge in two tribal court
systems (Shoshone and Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation and
the Omaha Tribe) and had worked for the National Congress of American
Indians and the Save the Children Federation. Ms. Rushing accomplished
the difficult task of establishing the SWITCA, as it came to be called,
balancing the flexibility required for it to adapt to the needs of each
tribal judicial system with the need for programmatic stability so that
the Law Center could comply with the contract and maintain the quality
of management of the project. In 1991, Ms. Rushing became Chief,
Branch of Judicial Services for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, directing
the judicial programs of that agency and providing assistance to tribal
judicial systems.
In the early 90's, the Law Center, working with Walter F, McDonald
& Associates, entered into a cooperative agreement with the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the tribal administration of juvenile justice programs
throughout the nation. The study was prompted by the report of a task
force organized by the Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Committees under the leadership of Ned Norris, the outstanding chief judge
of the Tohono O'Odom Nation in Arizona. The task force had reviewed
tribal participation in federally-funded juvenile justice programs and found
(along the lines of the Law Center's FIDAP work of the 1970's) that
tribal governments were largely excluded from the program, and where
they were included it was not appropriate to the needs of tribal governments. As a result of the task force report, the Congress mandated
a nationwide study to determine the extent to which tribal government
practices and procedures were consistent with the federal statutory mandates, problems faced by tribal juvenile justice systems, and the resources
available to tribes to support juvenile justice systems. The Juvenile Justice
Study took place over a two-year period involving a questionnaire mailed
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to all tribes, in-depth site visits to reservations, and several focus group
sessions for Alaska Native Village representatives. It came to several
conclusions regarding national studies of tribal problems, federal programming policy and juvenile justice in particular.
As to national studies of tribal problems, previous studies had all been
faulted for their failure to obtain a large tribal participation rate and
for the quality of the resulting data. The Law Center/McDonald study
was able to achieve a remarkable participation rate of the tribes operating
juvenile justice systems. More important, the Law Center concluded, the
Congress should not expect that individual Indian tribes would keep data
in a form ideally suited to national policymaking. Each tribe tended to
define terms in a slightly different way and to organize and manage its
data in a slightly different way, making comparisons difficult and conclusions dubious. But this fact, an outgrowth of the tribes' natural
independence and the federal policy of tribal self-determination, should
not, the Law Center warned, be interpreted as a flaw in tribal administration. For the federal government to expect that hundreds of tribal
and village governments would organize their local administrative data
in a way exactly suited to the curiosity of policymakers in Washington
might be considered as the height of self-absorption. The standard recommendation of studies of this type is that Congress should fund a
"definitive" data collection system to ensure that the next study would
produce better data. The Law Center/McDonald study merely noted that
tribes would probably continue to organize their data to meet local needs
unless some reason existed for them to conform to a national data system.
As to programming, the Law Center/McDonald study again departed
from the standard study approach. Studies of this type normally conclude
that the problem in question is urgent among Indian tribes, and that the
federal government should create a special program to deal with it. While
not downplaying the seriousness of juvenile delinquency on Indian reservations, the study attempted to draw the attention of Congress to the
larger issue. For a number of years, tribal self-determination has been
the governing policy in federal Indian affairs, a policy tending in the
direction of allowing tribes the maximum flexibility in programming
federal funds. But, Congress has not given clear direction to the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service, the two principal federal
agencies working on Indian reservations, as to the nature of their role.
To what degree should these agencies look to the tribes for policy and
programming leadership, and to what degree should they be held accountable for creating national programs to deal with tribal problems?
As it turns out, the Bureau of Indian Affairs is frequently held responsible
by Congress for the lack of a comprehensive program in a particular
area despite the emphasis on tribal self-government. As for the categorical
program agencies, such as the OJJDP, Congress has usualfy given them
little direction as to how to approach Indian tribes, how to integrate
tribal self-determination into their program structures, and how their
categorical programs should relate to the general program responsibilities
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The study recommended that Congress
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should address this fundamental policy issue for the sake both of tribal
government and federal program administration.
As to the administration of juvenile justice systems by tribal governments, the study came to a number of conclusions and made several
recommendations. The problem of juvenile delinquency was a serious
one, the study found, although it is almost entirely associated with
substance abuse. In many instances the tribal data are misleading, because
of the inflationary impact of repeat offenses being counted separately,
giving the impression of a larger number of delinquent youth than is
the case. The study also found that tribal data can be misleading because
Indian youth are often classified in tribal data systems in accordance
with categories needed for the tribe to obtain jurisdiction over them or
to fit them into program eligibility categories in order to obtain services
for them (classified as "Children in Need of Care" rather than charged
with criminal offenses, for example).
Finally, the study found that tribal governments often fall through the
cracks in the federal categorical grant system. Although the federal
government offers assistance with a comprehensive range of problems
associated with juvenile delinquency, such as substance abuse, family
problems, runaways, child abuse, etc., many tribes do not have enough
problems in any given category to qualify them for program assistance.
That is, a small tribe may have a number of troubled young people,
but not enough runaways to qualify for a Runaway Youth Program, to
give an example. Instead of creating yet another categorical program to
compete with the other federal programs and further confound tribal
government administration, the study recommended that the federal government coordinate among programs to enable small tribes to obtain
multi-agency assistance and to offer comprehensive family and youth
programs from a single reservation source.
The final report of juvenile justice study was submitted to the OJJDP
in early 1993, and a summary - without recommendations - was submitted
by OJJDP to Congress soon thereafter. It may be that the study was
lost in the transition from Bush to Clinton administrations, or it may
be that the refusal of the study to recommend more federal programs
as the solution to the problems of juvenile justice on Indian reservations
was a disappointment to the Department of Justice.
CONCLUSION
The successes and disappointments experienced by the American Indian
Law Center over the past 27 years, especially in contrast with other
events in the field, shed some light on American Indian policy studies.
The Law Center's greatest impact has been made through projects or
initiatives developed out of fortuitous, almost off-hand opportunities.
Tom Christopher convinced Fred Hart to start the summer program to
make his year in New Mexico more interesting; the Law Center became
interested in the relationship of tribal government to the federal domestic
assistance programs, and in federal management issues in general, because
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of an overheard bullying remark from a federal official to a group of
tribal chairmen. The World Council on Indigenous Peoples was formed
because George Manuel met Julius Neyere in Africa and the Law Center
became involved because Charles Trimble could not find anyone else who
could go to Guyana on short notice. The Commission on State-Tribal
Relations was created (and tribal-state political history changed) because
of an incidental, routine Saturday morning debate at an obscure National
Conference of State Legislatures' committee meeting. During the same
period, the high-profile national "definitive" policy efforts have proven
to be uniformly disappointing: the American Indian Policy Review Commission; the President's Commission on Reservation Economies; the investigation of fraud, waste and abuse in federal Indian programs by the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs; the National Indian Policy
Center at George Washington University. All of these efforts have raised
expectations and produced virtually nothing of lasting value.
The lesson to be drawn from this contrast is probably not that Indian
policy should be studied only randomly. But if the Law Center has made
a niche in Indian affairs, it is defined by its willingness, ability and
insistence on taking an independent look at policy issues regardless of
the prevailing national politics. The state-tribal commission represented
a high political risk, drawing criticism from several prominent tribal
leaders and tremendous resentment from the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
anxious to preserve its hegemony. Law Center positions on the administration of the Indian Self-Determination Act and the tribal judicial
improvement legislation have drawn fire from federal and tribal sources
alike.
Starting more or less at random, the American Indian Law Center
over the years has defined an identity for itself. The role it tries to play
in Indian affairs is to define important policy issues, to outline the
options and assess the risks of each option for tribal governments, and
to define problems in terms of systemic and structural flaws rather than
in terms of bad faith on the part of the government, the society, or
individuals. It tends to see many issues not in terms of superficial problems
that can be solved definitively but as inherent problems that must be
managed more effectively. The most important line the Law Center tries
to draw is between its role and the role of the Indian tribal governments,
believing as it does in true tribal self-determination. The Law Center's
role is to define the issues and assess the risks independently-independent
of fashion, of federal pressure or policy, and even, in some cases, of
tribal opinion. The role of the tribal governments as the responsible
political institutions is to weigh the risks and make a choice, trading off
risk and benefit as one does daily in politics.
This quixotic insistence on complete independence by the American
Indian Law Center has had its price. In a world that too often mistakes
banquets, receptions and conferences for reality, the Law Center has had
to struggle for funding. In a world that is comfortable with Indians in
cultural, political and economic stereotypes, the Law Center's insistence
that Indian cultures are private and internal matters for each tribe, family
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and individual rather than political marketing tools has been unfashionable.
The American Indian Law Center is not a lonely righteous organization
in a corrupt world. But if its 27 years teach a lesson, it is that Indian
policy can benefit more from the support of a wide variety of independent
analysts and investigators free to follow their own lights rather than
policy studies designed to investigate the particular interests of foundation,
congressional, federal executive or even tribal power centers. The enormous impact of gaming income on Indian affairs may prove to be the
death knell of tribal government or it may provide the means and the
opportunity for Indian tribal governments to define a permanent role in
the family of American governments, a role not tied to Indian poverty
or to the majority society's stereotypes of Indian culture. The difference
may well turn on whether the tribes are far-sighted enough to ensure
that policy issues are examined independently by a variety of scholars
and commentators and that they hear the bad news as well as the good.

